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           Executive Summary 
 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency recently finalized a rule that would 
reduce the maximum allowable level of arsenic in drinking water by 80 percent. While 
arsenic is thought to be essential for the human body at low levels, it can cause cancer 
when consumed at higher concentrations for extended periods of time. 
 
 This regulatory analysis evaluates the benefits and costs of the EPA’s rule. On the 
basis of currently available information, we find that the EPA’s standard cannot be 
justified on economic grounds. We also find that the final standard is likely to result in 
higher net benefits than the standard suggested in the proposed rule. Unfortunately, the 
final rule still has net costs. We estimate that the costs of the final rule will exceed the 
benefits by about $190 million annually.  
We find that the rule probably will result in a net loss of life. The direct effect of 
the rule will be to save about ten lives annually in the future. After taking into account the 
indirect impacts of the cost of the rule on items like health care expenditures, however, 
we find that the rule is likely to result in a net loss of about ten lives annually. 
A question that the rule does not examine carefully is whether other regulatory 
alternatives could result in positive net benefits. We explore the option of targeting 
specific water systems and find that this strategy is unlikely to be very helpful. Instead of 
regulating more stringently now, the agency should wait until more information becomes 
available over the next few years. Such a strategy would have the advantage of avoiding 
large capital expenditures until the time that evidence suggests that risks posed by arsenic 
in drinking water are significant. 
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EPA’s Arsenic Rule: 
The Benefits of the Standard Do Not Justify the Costs 
 




Arsenic is a naturally occurring element found throughout the world. It is often 
found in relatively high concentrations in drinking water.
1 While arsenic is thought to be 
essential for the human body at low levels, it is known to cause cancer when consumed at 
higher concentrations for extended periods of time.
2  
 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency recently finalized a rule that would 
reduce the maximum allowable level of arsenic in drinking water by 80 percent.
3 The 
purpose of this regulatory analysis is to evaluate the benefits and costs of the rule. On the 
basis of currently available information, we find that the EPA’s standard cannot be 
justified on economic grounds–i.e., the economic benefits do not justify the costs. We 
also find that the new standard will likely result in lower net benefits than the status quo, 
although the new standard is a major improvement from the one suggested in the rule 
proposed in the summer of 2000. We estimate that the costs of the new rule will exceed 
the benefits by about $ 190 million annually.
4 The costs of the rule will show up now, 
while the benefits in reduction in mortality and morbidity will not show up for at least a 
decade.  
  
                                                 
1 Arsenic is found in many organic and inorganic chemical compounds. Following the EPA’s analysis, 
we will not differentiate between these various compounds although doing so could reveal some additional 
insights on the appropriate way to regulate arsenic in drinking water. 
2 The mechanisms of harm are not well known, but various epidemiological studies have linked 
chronic arsenic exposure to bladder, lung, and skin cancers.  People exposed to very high levels have also 
experienced acute harm, but that level of exposure is rarely seen in the United States. 
3 See EPA (2001). The terms rule and regulation are used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
4 All benefit and cost numbers are annualized and presented in 1999 dollars using the consumer price 
index. All future benefits and costs are discounted using a 7 percent discount rate based on the guidelines of 
the Office of Management and Budget. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/inforeg/riaguide.html. 
Numbers are generally rounded to two significant figures.                                                                                                                                
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We find that the rule probably will result in a net loss of life. The direct effect of 
the rule will be to save about ten lives annually in the future.
5 After taking into account 
the indirect impacts of the cost of the rule on items like health care expenditures, 
however, we find that the rule is likely to result in a net loss of about ten lives annually.  
 
A question that the rule does not examine carefully is whether other regulatory 
alternatives could result in positive net benefits.
6 We explore the option of targeting 
specific water systems and find that this strategy is unlikely to be very helpful. Instead of 
regulating more stringently now, we suggest that the agency postpone implementation of 
the recent regulation until more information becomes available. Such a strategy would 
have the advantage of avoiding large capital expenditures until evidence suggests that 
risks posed by arsenic in drinking water are significant. 
 
In section 2 we describe the EPA’s new regulation and explain what is known 
about the risks associated with arsenic. Section 3 presents the results of our benefit-cost 
analysis, which builds on the EPA’s analysis. Section 4 presents conclusions and policy 
recommendations. 
2. EPA’s New Regulation of Arsenic 
 
Congress has amended the Safe Drinking Water Act several times since it was 
introduced in 1974.
7 The newest amendments direct the EPA to study and possibly 
regulate several contaminants including arsenic. The EPA recently reduced the maximum 
contaminant level for arsenic from 50 micrograms per liter (µg/L) to 10 µg/L for public 
water systems. The rule will require several thousand water systems to install new 
                                                 
5 By converting morbidity risk reduction into the equivalent mortality risk reduction, we express all 
risk reduction as a reduction in statistical deaths. We use the same technique as the agency did in its 
regulatory impact analysis. Each nonfatal cancer case is valued at one-tenth a fatal cancer case.  See EPA 
(2000b). Multiplying the reduced risk per person by times the total exposed population gives the estimate 
of the statistical lives saved. We base our calculations primarily on the cost and risk estimates presented in 
the EPA’s regulatory impact analysis (EPA 2000c) and proposed rule (EPA 2000b), and update those 
calculations to reflect the new estimates of risk presented in a subsequent document (EPA 2000a) and the 
final rule (EPA 2001).  
6 Net benefits equal benefits minus costs. 
7 See 42 U. S. C. §300g-1.                                                                                                                               
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equipment. Those water systems serve about 10 million people, who will likely have 
safer, more expensive water when water systems come into compliance with the new 
rule. 
 
The risks of high-level exposure to arsenic have been well documented.
8 The 
National Research Council found that arsenic in drinking water causes bladder, lung, and 
skin cancer when consumed in very high concentrations of several hundred µg/L. 
 
The recently finalized standard is associated with low-level exposure. The 
evidence of risk at those lower doses is very weak, however. The NRC report states that 
“no human studies of sufficient statistical power or scope have examined whether 
consumption of arsenic in drinking water at the current maximum contaminant level 
(approximately .001 mg/kg per day) results in an increased incidence of cancer or 
noncancer effects.”
9 In vitro studies suggest that risks may exist at those very low doses, 
according to the NRC. The quantification of such possible low-dose risks is difficult and 
must be inferred from animal and epidemiological studies that have quantified the risks 
of arsenic at high concentrations.  
 
By modeling the increased risk of bladder cancer, the NRC report demonstrates 
how the EPA could calculate the risk of all cancers. The EPA only calculates the risk of 
bladder and lung cancers and calls the risk of other cancers “nonquantifiable.”  
 
The data and methodology employed to estimate the risk of bladder cancer raise 
concerns, many of which are summarized in the NRC report. In calculating the risk of 
bladder cancer, the report assumes that risk is linearly related to arsenic concentration. 
That assumption is not realistic because the human body can metabolize arsenic at low 
levels, rendering it nontoxic.
10 The actual risks are likely to be much less than the risks 
calculated by using the linear dose-response model. Neither the NRC report nor the 
                                                 
8 See NRC (1999). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid.                                                                                                                               
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agency attempts to quantify the extent that the linear dose-response model may 
overestimate the actual risks of arsenic. 
 
EPA’s Analysis 
The Safe Drinking Water Act as amended in 1996 leaves a certain amount of 
discretion to the agency when setting standards for arsenic. The act directs the agency to 
use economic analysis to choose the standard.
11 The EPA performed a detailed 
assessment of the benefits and costs of regulating arsenic. 
 
The primary costs of the rule are the capital costs of installing water treatment 
facilities and the costs of operating them. The agency monetized those costs by 
multiplying the costs per system times the total number of systems required to install new 
technology.
12 As the agency considered more stringent maximum contaminant levels, 
progressively more systems would be required to install equipment. The costs of the rule 
therefore increase with tighter standards because more systems are required to install 
equipment. The costs for the final standard are over $200 million annually. 
 
The benefits of the rule also increase with tighter standards, because more people 
drink water with reduced concentrations of arsenic. The agency quantified the benefits of 
the reduced risk of bladder and lung cancer. The agency then expressed those benefits in 
dollars terms, but the agency did take into account when the benefits are likely to occur.
13 
Without correcting for the timing of the benefits, the agency valued the benefits at $170 
million annually. 
 
The agency found that the monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits, even 
without adjusting for the timing of the mortality risk reductions. As part of that 
                                                 
11 Sec. 300g-1(6)(A) states, “[I]f the Administrator determines … that the benefits of a maximum 
contaminant level … would not justify the costs of complying with the level, the Administrator may, after 
notice and opportunity for public comment, promulgate a maximum contaminant level for the contaminant 
that maximizes health risk reduction benefits at a cost that is justified by the benefits.” 
12 The actual calculation also involves determining the type of technology that each system will likely 
choose.  
13 The agency did take into account the timing of the benefits in its sensitivity analysis but failed to 
include the results of that calculation in its best estimate.                                                                                                                               
  
5
assessment, the act requires the agency to state whether the benefits of the rule justify the 
costs. Even though the quantified costs far exceeded the quantified benefits, the agency 
stated that the benefits of the arsenic rule justified the costs and therefore chose to 
finalize the rule.
14 The agency suggested that the “nonquantifiable” benefits were 
sufficient to make up for the low monetized benefits. 
 
The EPA made several questionable judgments in calculating of benefits and 
costs. We will briefly discuss two such mistakes. First, the EPA uses a linear response 
curve. As has been noted, the risks are likely to be sublinear.
15 Second, the EPA used an 
upper bound as its best estimate at several points.
16 Finally, the agency did not take into 
account the timing of the benefits. 
 
3. Our Benefit-Cost Analysis 
 
We use the EPA’s analysis as the basis for our analysis, but our analysis differs 
from the EPA’s in several ways. First, we explicitly estimate the marginal benefits and 
costs of the rule. That enables us to estimate the standard that would maximize net 
benefits under different assumptions. Second, we explicitly take account of the effects of 
                                                 
14 The agency noted that “Congress did not direct EPA to ensure strict equality of monetizable costs 
and benefits in applying its discretionary authorities under [the Act].” It should be noted that ensuring 
equality of benefits and costs is a sure way to guarantee that a regulation does not increase social welfare. 
In fact, we believe that the term justify should be read to mean that the incremental costs are about equal to 
the incremental benefits. As we will show, the benefits of the EPA’s standard cannot be said to “justify” the 
costs under any plausible scenario. 
15 “All of these risk distributions are linear in the mean, and thus may be conservative assumptions, as 
the NRC report suggested the true relationship may be sublinear. If the true relationship is sublinear, i.e., 
lower than the straight line from 50 ug/L to zero, the true risks below 50 ug/L are being overestimates.” See 
EPA (2000c). The EPA uses NRC table 10-11 for the risk analysis in the proposed rule, which uses a model 
that is “linear in concentration,” but previous EPA documents state that a linear response curve would 
likely lead to a large overestimate. See EPA document W-99-16 I-B.73 and EPA (2000c). “There is clear 
evidence that arsenic ingested at high doses can cause cancer in humans. The risk of skin cancer at doses 
encountered in the US tap water has not been empirically determined. This depends in part on the ability of 
the human body to efficiently detoxify relatively small doses of ingested arsenic. Convincing evidence of 
human metabolism of ingested inorganic arsenic has been presented by the EPA (see Section VIII of the 
Health Criteria Document). Specifically, conversion by the liver of inorganic arsenic by methylation to 
MMA and DMA….The findings indicate that daily doses of 250 to 1000 ug As(3+)/person/day or less may 
be largely detoxified.” If a linear response curve is used, it could be a large overestimate. If the metabolism 
is not taken into account, the risks of cancer induction at lower levels of intake are then likely to be greatly 
exaggerated.                                                                                                                                
  
6
latency on net benefits. Third, we consider several sensitivity analyses and introduce an 
estimate for the EPA’s “nonquantifiable” benefits category. Fourth, we quantify the 
indirect impacts of the rule on lives saved as well as the direct impacts. Fifth, we consider 
a wider range of policy alternatives than the EPA considered, including targeting 
particular water systems and trading. 
 
The EPA used a value of $6.1 million for a statistical life in its benefits 
calculations, but did not account for timing of the benefits in the agency’s best estimate.
17 
In the final rule the agency did account for latency, but only included those numbers in a 
sensitivity analysis.
18 Future benefits should be discounted just as future costs are.
19 If the 
effects of arsenic exposure are delayed many years, the benefits of reducing arsenic 
exposure are also likely to be delayed. If one applies a latency period of thirty years, a 
discount rate of 7 percent, an income growth rate of 1 percent and an income elasticity of 
1 percent, the best estimate of a value of a statistical life is reduced to $1.1 million.
20 
 
There are five scenarios: the first uses EPA’s analysis of the risk of arsenic and its 
assumption on the value of a statistical life ($6.1 million); the second through fifth 
scenarios use a value of $1.1 million, which is adjusted for the impact of latency. The 
second scenario adjusts the value of a statistical life to account for latency, but otherwise 
applies the EPA’s basic approach–including its estimate of the reduced mortality; the 
third increases the estimate of lives saved by a factor of four to account for our upper-
bound estimate of the “nonquantifiable” benefits but does not account for the likely 
                                                                                                                                            
16 The EPA, for example, took the 90 percent confidence interval of water intake and used it for the 
agency’s best estimate. See EPA (2000c). 
17 The term “value of a statistical life” used by economists is somewhat misleading. Economists are 
trying to measure what people are willing to pay for small changes in the probability of reducing different 
kinds of health and safety risks, not the value of saving a life. 
18 In our original comment to the agency, we argued that the agency should account for latency. See 
Burnett and Hahn (2000). 
19 This recommendation is similar to the one that the EPA’s Science Advisory Board made in the 
summer of 2000 (EPA 2000d). 
20 It is not clear that adjusting for income is appropriate in this situation. These parameters are used 
for illustration. The EPA chose to use three latency periods in its sensitivity analysis, including a five-, ten-, 
and twenty-year latency period. Many cancers have between a twenty- and forty-year latency period. Since 
bladder cancer is known to have a long latency period, we feel that thirty years is reasonable and use it in 
our calculations. Using a ten- or twenty-year latency would not materially change our results or                                                                                                                               
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sublinear dose-response function of arsenic;
21 the fourth accounts for our best estimate of 
the “nonquantifiable” benefits and the sublinear dose-response function; and the fifth 
provides a reasonable lower bound estimate on the number of lives saved.
22 Taken 
together, those scenarios suggest a range of five to 100 lives saved annually.
23  
 
The fourth scenario reflects our best estimate. It takes the EPA’s costs as given 
because we have no other data on costs. We take the EPA’s estimate of 28 lives saved, 
multiply by two to account for “nonquantifiable” benefits, and then divide by five to 
account for the non-linear dose-response function. Our reasoning is that including 
“nonquantifiable” risks would increase the lives-saved estimate by some factor between 
one and four.
24 Conversely, a sublinear risk extrapolation method would reduce the 
lives-saved estimate by some factor between one and ten.
25 On the basis of those 
assumptions, the EPA’s rule would save about eleven lives annually.
26  
 
Table 1 summarizes some of the key results on benefits, costs, net benefits, and 
lives saved under different assumptions. The first column of the table specifies the 
particular scenario; the second, third, fourth and fifth columns note the lives saved, 
benefits, costs, and net benefits, respectively. The final column provides an estimate of 
                                                                                                                                            
conclusions. The income elasticity is defined as the percentage change in the willingness to pay to avoid a 
small change in risk of dying for a percentage change in income. 
21  The NRC report states that risks of all cancers may be eight times greater than the risk of bladder 
cancer alone. See NRC (1999). The EPA’s analysis includes the risk of both bladder and lung cancer. The 
agency estimates the risk of bladder and lung cancer to be twice that of bladder cancer (EPA 2000a). To 
reflect the NRC report we therefore multiply the EPA’s estimates by four to obtain our upper bound 
estimate. 
22 This is our best estimate of the reduction of arsenic risk. The indirect wealth effects are discussed 
below and represent our best estimate of the net effect of the rule. 
23 These are order of magnitude estimates.  We could just as well have used 2 and 200 for our 
bounding exercise, but the qualitative conclusion would remain the same. 
24 The NRC reports suggests that the risk of death from all types of cancer may be eight times greater 
than the risk of bladder cancer deaths alone. See NRC (1999). Because the EPA’s quantified estimate of the 
risk of arsenic includes both the risk from bladder and lung cancer, a reasonable upper bound on risk from 
all types of cancer is four times the EPA’s estimate. 
25 The NRC report provides some limited evidence that suggests how a sublinear dose-response model 
could be constructed. About 80 percent of the toxic inorganic arsenic is metabolized to nontoxic organic 
forms when arsenic is consumed at low levels but the body’s ability to metabolize arsenic appears to be 
saturated at higher levels. A possible sublinear model is to assume that only 20 percent of the ingested 
arsenic is toxic at low levels while almost all of it is toxic at much higher levels. That would imply that the 
actual risk is only about a fifth of that suggested by a linear response model. 
26 We address the problem of this large uncertainty by using sensitivity analysis.                                                                                                                               
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the cost per life saved. The calculation of the cost-effectiveness per life accounts for 
latency in all but the first scenario. That is accomplished by discounting the lives saved in 
the same way that benefits and costs are discounted. 
 
The basic message of table 1 is that the EPA’s recent standard of 10 µg/L makes 
no economic sense. Economic costs exceed economic benefits for the chosen standard 
and all alternatives considered by the EPA. In our best estimate, net costs are close to 
$190 million and only eleven lives are saved. Indeed, for all five cases, net costs are 
between $10 million and $200 million, and the cost-effectiveness is never less than $6.4 
million per statistical life.
27 In addition, the rule saves relatively few lives in all scenarios. 
With an affected population of about 10 million people, the risk reduction is about one in 
1 million, which is so small as not to be worth addressing, given the uncertainties in the 
data and the EPA’s limited resources to develop regulations.  
 
There is also a reasonable chance that the recent rule will actually increase overall 
health risks. The reason is that the costs of complying with the rule reduce the amount of 
private resources that people have to spend on a wide range of activities, including health 
care, children’s education, and automobile safety. When people have fewer resources, 
they spend less to reduce risks. The resulting increase in risk offsets the direct reduction 
in risk attributable to a government action.
28 Moreover, if that direct risk reduction is 
small and the regulation is very ineffective relative to its cost, then total risk could rise 
instead of fall.  
 
Economists have used a value of between $10 million and $50 million per 
statistical life saved for the point at which overall risks associated with a rule would 
actually increase net risk.
29 A plausible best estimate is $15 million per life saved.
30 On 
                                                 
27 We adjust for latency in all but the first scenario. 
28 See Wildavsky  (1980).  
29 See Hahn, Lutter and Viscusi (2000). 
30 See Lutter, Morrall, and Viscusi (1999).                                                                                                                               
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the basis of that analysis, it is likely that the rule will result in a net increase in risk, since 
the average cost per life saved is about $65 million in scenario 4, our best estimate.
31  
 
One of the issues that the EPA does not carefully address is whether there is a less 
stringent standard greater than 10 µg/L but less than 50 µg/L that would result in positive 
net benefits. Figure 1 provides some insight into that question.
32 Figure 1a shows the 
marginal cost curve, based on our best estimate. The vertical axis is a logarithmic scale in 
millions of dollars, and the horizontal axis plots lives saved.
33 The marginal benefit curve 
is horizontal and is based on a $6.1 million value of a statistical life.  
 
 The most important point to note about figure 1a is that the marginal benefit curve 
and the marginal cost curve do not intersect. That is, marginal costs are everywhere 
greater than the marginal benefits, so the previous standard should not have been 
changed. A second point to note is that for the EPA’s recent standard, the marginal costs 
exceed marginal benefits by well over $100 million annually. A third point is that the 
previous standard itself may be excessively high. While we did not explore the 
implications of relaxing the previous standard, it is possible that the EPA would have 
increased social welfare by relaxing the standard or introducing a targeted relaxation of 
the standard instead of tightening the standard as the agency has done.
34  
 
                                                 
31 The marginal cost per life saved is higher, which means an even greater net increase in risks would 
occur at the margin. The rule costs about $210 million per year. That implies that the decrease in wealth 
caused by the rule would lead to about fourteen more fatalities per year starting immediately. In our best 
estimate, the rule saves about eleven lives starting about thirty years in the future. Discounting those lives 
to the present suggests that the rule may cause a net increase in mortality by about ten lives per year. 
32 We were unable to reproduce all of the EPA’s calculations. Figures 1 and 2 are based on our own 
analysis, which was adjusted so that the overall cost and benefit numbers are consistent with EPA’s 
analysis. The cost-effectiveness is fairly close in both our model and the EPA’s model, and all of the 
qualitative conclusions hold.  
33  The marginal cost curve was created by calculating the cost associated with a progressively tighter 
standard. Those costs are the capital and operating costs of the systems that would need to install 
equipment to come into compliance. The marginal benefit curve was calculated by multiplying the number 
of people affected by a progressively tighter standard multiplied by the risk reduction per person. 
34 Even though figure 1 suggests that marginal benefits exceed marginal costs at the current standard, 
we cannot say whether efficiency would be enhanced by a relaxation of the standard on the basis of this 
analysis.  The reason is that the marginal cost curve is calculated by reducing in the uniform standard from 
its current level. That cost includes capital investments as well as operating costs.  The marginal cost of 
increasing the uniform standard would only involve operating costs initially, so there is a discontinuity in 
the marginal cost at the current standard.                                                                                                                               
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Figure 1b is based on the same data as figure 1a but illustrates the ideas in terms 
of costs per life saved. The horizontal axis plots the maximum contaminant level, and the 
vertical axis is a logarithmic scale in millions of dollars per life saved. At the EPA’s 
standard of 10 µg/L, the average cost per life saved is $65 million, which exceeds the 
value placed on a statistical life of $6.1 million by a factor of ten.
35 The other standards 
that EPA considered also are not cost-effective. The same calculation can be made for 
other scenarios, but the qualitative conclusions remain the same; further regulation is 
justified only if the risk of arsenic is many times our best estimate. 
 
Another approach to increasing the net benefits of regulation is by targeting 
particular water suppliers that have a relatively low cost per life saved. Unfortunately, 
targeting is unlikely to do much. Figure 2 indicates that targeting the larger water systems 
is still not likely to result in net benefits when we use the best estimate of the risks of 
arsenic because the average cost per life saved exceeds the value of a statistical life even 
at 50 µg/L. 
 
Still another alternative the EPA may want to consider is to allow trading of rights 
to allow arsenic in the water supply. While we are doubtful that trading would yield 
positive net benefits for the rule that the EPA chose to finalize, we think that the agency 
should seriously consider trading as a way of reducing costs while achieving similar 
levels of risk reduction. 
 
The agency also should consider the timing for proposing and finalizing rules. 
One key advantage of waiting to regulate is that uncertainty may be resolved. One such 
uncertainty in the current rule is the risk of arsenic. To address that uncertainty, the EPA 
has commissioned several studies that will report results in the next few years.
36 The 
                                                 
35 The marginal cost-effectiveness is much greater than the average cost-effectiveness. 
36 The results of one such study were not available at the time of the proposed rule but were 
incorporated in the analysis of the final rule. See Morales et al. (2000).                                                                                                                               
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agency should delay implementation of the new arsenic rule at least until the results of 
those studies are available. Those results could greatly affect the optimal standard.
37 
 
 In summary, our analysis of the net benefits of the arsenic rule suggests that 
tightening the standard is not likely to improve economic welfare; nor is targeting 
specific water systems likely to help much. We think that trading may be a reasonable 
way of reducing costs if the EPA tightens the standard. Furthermore, waiting on the 
results of research assessing the possible link between arsenic and lung cancer could have 
potentially significant benefits. 
 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Regulation of arsenic in drinking water cannot be justified on benefit-cost 
grounds when using EPA’s numbers. That conclusion appears to be fairly robust, given 
the agency’s cost numbers and plausible estimates of the value of a statistical life and 
benefits.  
 
We offer the following six recommendations in hopes of improving policy 
outcomes and the quality of analysis: 
 
Recommendation 1: The EPA should not implement its new federal regulation for 
arsenic because the agency has not shown that the benefits exceed the costs for such 
regulations.  
 
Discussion: The failure of the rule to pass a benefit-cost test was noted above, but 
an issue related to the size of the risk also exists. The EPA’s rule only reduces the risk 
from arsenic by about ten statistical lives. The total population served by the water 
systems is more than 50 million people. The associated risk reduction is less than one in 1 
                                                 
37 The optimal standard is defined as the standard that maximizes expected net benefits, given the 
current understanding of the benefits and costs.                                                                                                                               
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million. In general, the government should not concern itself with reducing risks that are 
so small.  
 
Recommendation 2: The EPA and other regulatory agencies should strive to keep 
their analysis and presentation of results simple. 
 
Discussion: We are struck with the unnecessary complexity of the analysis and 
the presentation of the results in that and other regulatory impact analyses. The analysis 
could have been simplified by calculating incremental costs and benefits along the lines 
presented in table 1 and figure 1. Then, in the executive summary, the agency could have 
pointed out that the standard is likely to have only a modest impact on lives saved and 
that the standard is unlikely to pass a benefit-cost test. Therefore, the standard is not 
worth mandating. We believe that the analysis of that issue did not warrant a 
several-hundred-page document. 
 
Recommendation 3: The EPA should consider alternatives more carefully.  
 
Discussion: The EPA did not carefully consider alternatives in its analysis. The 
alternatives include waiting before regulating, imposing tighter or less stringent 
standards, targeting particular systems, and using market-based instruments to achieve 
the standard. Such calculations could have been helpful in framing policy choices. 
 
Recommendation 4: Agencies should use sensitivity analysis to assess so-called 
nonquantifiable factors that are important. 
 
Discussion: We showed how in this regulatory impact analysis sensitivity analysis 
could be used to estimate the possible impact on net benefits of a large increase in risk 
due to various cancers. Agencies should strive to incorporate such factors in their 
analyses to determine whether they would affect key policy conclusions. The proposed 
rule argued that the benefits from reducing lung cancer could not be quantified; however,                                                                                                                               
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the agency was able to quantify that benefit in the analysis of the final rule. We believe 
that a similar approach should be taken for the other so-called nonquantifiable benefits. 
 
Recommendation 5: The EPA should consider the indirect impact of the cost of 
the arsenic regulation on mortality. 
 
Discussion:  The agency should consider adverse indirect effects that result from 
the cost of a regulation, particularly when those effects are likely to exceed the positive 
impacts of the rule.  Our analysis suggested that the proposed arsenic standard would 
actually increase overall risk when those indirect effects are taken into account.   
 
Recommendation 6: The EPA should discount for the effects of latency in the 
agency’s best estimate. 
 
Discussion: In the EPA’s best estimate, the agency fails to take into account the 
impact of latency by discounting expected reductions in future risks back to the present. 
Such discounting should be used to maximize net social benefits for this regulation.
38 The 
agency did show the effects of discounting for latency in a sensitivity analysis but should 
have included those results in the main analysis. While the exact latency period is 
uncertain, the science suggests that all the cancers caused by arsenic do have a latency 
period.  Moreover, taking that latency period into account will affect the conclusions of 
the analysis. By assuming that the latency period does not matter, the agency clearly 
biases the results of its benefit-cost analysis in favor of its newly lowered standard. 
                                                 
38 We are sensitive to the fact that such discounting may not be appropriate when concerns with 





1 Benefits Costs Net Costs
2 Cost-Effectiveness
3
EPA's Model without Accounting 
for Latency
28 $170 million $210 million $40 million
$7.5 million per 
statistical life
EPA's Model Accounting for 
Latency
28 $50 million $210 million $160 million
$26 million per 
statistical life
Our High Estimate
4 110 $200 million $210 million $10 million
$6.4 million per 
statistical life
Our Best Estimate
5 11 $23 million $210 million $190 million
$65 million per 
statistical life
Our Low Estimate 5.5 $10 million $210 million $200 million
$130 million per 
statistical life
EPA's Arsenic Rule with Different Assumptions
Table 1
2 Net costs are costs minus benefits. Numbers may not add owing to rounding.
5 Our best estimate includes "non-quantifiable" benefits, accounts for latency, and incorporates a sublinear dose-response function. See the text for details.
4 We obtain our upper-bound estimate by taking the EPA's model, including "non-quantifiable" benefits and accounting for latency.
3 See the text for details.





Optimal Standard with Our Best Estimate of Risk
























































































































($6.1 Million per Life)
20 µg/L 10 µg/L
2 5 µg/L
1 The slight bumps in figure 1a represent artifacts from the model.
2 The maximum contaminant level was 10 µg/L in EPA's final rule and was 5 µg/L in the agency's original proposal. 
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Cost-Effectiveness of Small Systems





























































Effect of Targeting Different Size Water Systems
1 
MCL (µg/L)
Note: The figure assumes our best estimate for the risks of arsenic.
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